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SUPERVISING MANAGED SERVICES
JAMES B. SPETA†
ABSTRACT
Many Internet-access providers simultaneously offer Internet
access and other services, such as traditional video channels, video on
demand, voice calling, and other emerging services, through a single,
converged platform. These other services—which can be called
“managed services” because the carrier offers them only to its
subscribers in a manner designed to ensure some quality of service—
in many circumstances will compete with services that are offered by
unaffiliated parties as applications or services on the Internet. This
situation creates an important interaction effect between the domains
of Internet access and managed services, an effect that has largely
been missing from the decade-long debate over network neutrality
rules for Internet service. This Article examines this interaction effect,
focusing on the context of online video services and on the recent
NBC-Comcast transaction that finally highlighted these concerns. The
Article contends that, when these interaction effects are understood, a
nondiscrimination rule applied only to a converged carrier’s Internet
service can be rendered ineffective by the carrier’s move to managed
services offerings. As a result, a nondiscrimination rule, if it is to be
effective, would need to be supplemented by specific behavioral or
structural rules that both require the carrier to maintain its Internet
service and limit the carrier’s freedom of action in the managed
services domain. This reveals the difficulty of drafting effective
nondiscrimination rules. It also reveals that noneconomic
justifications for nondiscrimination rules cannot stand alone; they
must be supplemented by the economic-reasoning tools common to
antitrust argument, in order to identify and determine the ultimate
effects of the rules.

Copyright © 2011 by James B. Speta.
† Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law. I would like to thank the
Duke Law Journal Administrative Law Symposium participants and editors for very useful
feedback and suggestions. Errors and omissions remain mine.
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INTRODUCTION
Society is finally beginning to see in stark relief the business
interactions between multiple modes of content distribution on a
single platform—and the regulatory responses to those business
interactions. Indeed, this past fall provided a perfect example of these
challenges of convergence, the phenomenon that general-purpose
digital platforms can carry any form of content, an example that
highlights the central difficulty facing the Federal Communications
Commission’s (FCC) view of Internet regulation. In October, in the
course of particularly contentious, but otherwise typical, carriage
negotiations between Fox Television and Cablevision, in which the
broadcaster, as sometimes happens in these negotiations, had
temporarily pulled its signal off the cable system, Fox also decided to
deny Cablevision’s Internet subscribers access to Fox’s video content.
1
Specifically, for a brief period of time, Fox instructed Hulu to block
Cablevision subscribers’ access to Fox content hosted on Hulu’s site
2
and, apparently, did the same on its own Fox.com website. Fox’s
position was understandable: any leverage it had over Cablevision
came from denying Cablevision’s customers content those customers
wanted to watch. And, if Cablevision’s cable customers, most of
whom also had broadband service, could simply watch that same
content on their Internet service, then Fox’s leverage was severely

1. Hulu is an online video provider that aggregates television programming from
numerous different networks and programmers. See infra text accompanying notes 111–13.
2. See Ben Drawbaugh, News Corp Pulls Its Hulu Content from Cablevision Customers,
Escalating Carriage Dispute, ENGADGET.COM (Oct. 16, 2010, 4:21 PM), http://www.
engadget.com/2010/10/16/news-corp-removes-hulu-from-cablevision-escalating-carriage-dis;
Brian Stelter & Bill Carter, In Cable TV Fights, Consumers Wait to See Who Blinks, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 17, 2010, at A27.
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diminished. Fox’s action, however, was met with outrage, for it
seemed to many that Fox had violated a norm of the Internet—that
material made available on the Internet would be made available on
4
equal terms to anyone with an Internet connection. This is, indeed, a
strongly but not universally practiced norm. Although many Internet
services and sites do require payments, there are only a few examples
of Internet services or content being made available only to some
people in a way that an individual could not (even if he wished) offer
5
the site the going rate for access to the content.
This episode reveals the need to consider the manner in which
content and carriage services interact and to try to disentangle that
interaction as the market moves forward into the next generation of
FCC regulation. This episode, in fact, highlights one of the multiple
dimensions on which Internet services and more traditional media
services interact—interaction that has not generally been
acknowledged. While regulators, scholars, and the public have been
debating the question of nondiscrimination regulation of Internet
6
services for more than a decade now, the relationship of Internet
services to more traditional services has played only a small and

3. See, e.g., Ryan Nakashima, Turning Off Free Web TV, PRESS ATLANTIC CITY, Oct. 26,
2010, at B1 (“Fox abandoned its Internet blockade after about 12 hours following protests from
several lawmakers, including Rep. Edward Markey, D-Mass., a senior member on a House
subcommittee that oversees technology and the Internet.”); Rob Pegoraro, In Fox-Cablevision
Dispute, Both Sides Lose—And So Do the Viewers, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2010, at G1 (“Fox,
meanwhile, burned whatever goodwill it might have had with viewers by briefly preventing
Cablevision Internet subscribers—even if they paid another company for TV service—from
watching Fox programs at Hulu or its Fox.com site. This clueless, quickly reversed shoot-thehostage move did little beyond making the powerlessness of Hulu’s management obvious—and
showing a profound lack of imagination by whoever in Fox’s Los Angeles headquarters signed
off on it.”).
4. I am setting aside private individual or corporate use of services that are made
available via Internet connections, such as remote access to corporate networks. These are not
Internet services in the sense that I mean: they do not have an arguable public aspect to them,
and they are not covered by the norm. On the norm, see generally Philip J. Weiser, The Future
of Internet Regulation, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 529, 531 (2009), which discusses the early and
continuing norm of openness on the Internet and the challenge to that norm by commercial
interests.
5. The principal commercial example that I have in mind is ESPN3.com, in which the
content is made available only to those customers whose Internet service provider (ISP) has
entered into a subscription relationship with ESPN. See infra notes 122–26 and accompanying
text.
6. For two of the early examples, see generally Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig,
Open Access to Cable Modems, 22 WHITTIER L. REV. 3 (2000); and James B. Speta,
Handicapping the Race for the Last Mile?: A Critique of Open Access Rules for Broadband
Platforms, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 39 (2000).
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occasional role in the debate. One level of the relationship asks
whether Internet services themselves are “managed” in the same
manner as more traditional media services—that is, whether the
carrier decides on the total mix of services being offered, or whether
the carrier simply provides bandwidth to the customer and the
customer then finds on the Internet the content and services that the
customer wants. This issue—obviously oversimplified—had and has
consequences for the fundamental characterization question of
whether Internet services are common-carrier services like traditional
telephone service or something else. And, of course, whether Internet
services are considered common-carrier services has consequences for
8
the FCC’s current regulatory authority, for First Amendment
9
analysis, and for our intuitions about how Internet services should be
provisioned and supervised.
The second level of the relationship between Internet services
and more traditionally managed services has appeared much less
frequently in the debate, but this second level will increasingly define
the challenges for nondiscrimination regulation and, perhaps, for
communications policy more broadly. From the very beginning,
cable-modem Internet service has been offered by companies that
simultaneously offered other services over the very same facilities,
namely traditional cable service. DSL providers did not
simultaneously offer other services due to its more limited bandwidth,
but the telephone companies’ premier broadband services of today
simultaneously offer Internet, linear video (video offered through
traditional, programmed channels), and other services. The FCC’s
recently completed National Broadband Plan report makes clear that
10
in the future such platforms will be the center of broadband service.
And yet the regulatory machinery has only very recently begun to
address this interaction. It was only in the FCC’s September 2010 call

7. See infra Part I.
8. See, e.g., James B. Speta, The Shaky Foundations of the Regulated Internet, 8 J. ON
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 101, 124 (2010) (noting that the FCC’s regulatory power over
Internet sources flows from its authority over common carriers).
9. See generally Stuart Minor Benjamin, Transmitting, Editing, and Communicating:
Determining What “the Freedom of Speech” Encompasses, 60 DUKE L.J. 1673 (2011) (arguing
that bare transmission is not speech under First Amendment analysis).
10. See generally FCC, CONNECTING AMERICA: THE NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN 42
(2010),
available
at
http://download.broadband.gov/plan/national-broadband-plan.pdf
(discussing the emergence of high-speed cable and fiber as the platforms of choice to meet
emerging consumer demands).
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for additional comment in its Open Internet proceeding that the FCC
finally recognized the reality that a carrier’s decisions on Internet
services are only part of a broader decision on how to use its
11
infrastructure more generally. That is, a carrier chooses how much
bandwidth to devote to Internet service and how much to devote to
video channels, and this choice can affect consumers’ ability to trade
off between the two types of service. For example, if the “Internet
channel” is wide enough that a household can watch simultaneous
high-definition video streams over its Internet service, then there is
no technological reason for a consumer to also subscribe to the
simultaneously offered multichannel service. By contrast, if the
Internet channel does not have enough bandwidth for everyone in the
household to satisfy his or her video hunger, then the Internet service
cannot be a complete substitute for the multichannel video service.
The carrier’s choice is even more important when the carrier is also
deciding how much bandwidth and quality of service to allocate to
video-on-demand services.
This planning decision, at one time, may have had a
technological dimension, but today it is essentially a business
decision, and it is this business dimension that creates the most
difficulty from a regulatory perspective. On traditional video
channels, the content creator and the carrier-distributor negotiated to
12
share the surplus that the service created. But with Internet service,
the distributor has been limited to bandwidth charges—that is, the
carrier cannot negotiate to share in the surplus of any particularly
valuable content. And this norm, which network neutrality
proponents seek to codify in law, influences design decisions in a
number of ways. For the carriers, it creates some incentive to restrict
their Internet services so that they can drive customers to the
platform on which the carriers’ negotiating position is better. It also
creates the incentive to seek out forms of exclusivity and to duplicate
traditional business models.
Although this precise phenomenon—the carrier that
simultaneously offers a traditional video service or other managed
services alongside its Internet service—is perhaps new,

11. Further Inquiry into Two Under-Developed Issues in the Open Internet Proceeding, 75
Fed. Reg. 55,297 (proposed Sept. 10, 2010) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. ch. I).
12. See Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, Video Games: The Oddly Familiar Terms of Debate
About Telco Entry into the Video Services Market, 5 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 1, 4
(2006) (detailing the early practices of the cable television industry).

SPETA IN PRINTER PROOF (REVISED).DOC

4/21/2011 5:29:28 PM

1720

[Vol. 60:1715

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

communications law and policy has precedents from which to judge
an appropriate regulatory paradigm. Congress, through the
13
Communications Act, and the FCC have considered the value of
vertical integration against its risks, as well as the value of
nondiscrimination rules more generally. This Article explores those
precedents and discusses their possible application to this brave new
world of broadband service.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. First, the Article describes
the place of the managed-services concern in the current debate over
the regulation of broadband carriers. By “managed services,” which
the regulators have sometimes called “specialized services,” I mean
those services that the carriers offer on a subscription basis, whether
on demand or linearly programmed, but outside of their generalpurpose Internet connection. Current examples are broadband
carriers’ voice-over-Internet-Protocol (VoIP) services and video on
demand. Until very recently, regulators and commentators have not
acknowledged that nondiscrimination rules might have feedback into
the carriers’ incentives over more traditional services or over the
innovation path for new services. The Comcast-NBC transaction did
finally bring this concern to the fore, and the conditions imposed on
the transaction represent one attempt to address it. Second, the
Article describes the business consequences that attach to the
carriers’ simultaneous offering of such services, against the backdrop
of video economics that fundamentally involve windowing and tiering
in distribution—practices that allow selective exclusivity in the service
of price discrimination. I describe three emerging online video
distributors, each of which employs a different kind of exclusivity, to
highlight the business models affected by nondiscrimination rules.
Third, the Article contends that this context shows that
nondiscrimination rules over Internet services can only work if they
are backed up by reticulated behavioral limits on other services
offered by integrated carriers. As a result, the only intellectual frame
through which the issue can profitably be addressed is the frame of
antitrust analysis. No freestanding nondiscrimination rule will be
effective.

13. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
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I. MANAGED SERVICES AND THE NETWORK NEUTRALITY DEBATE
In this Part, I discuss how the network neutrality debate, and in
particular the FCC, has only recently come to articulate and address
the issue of managed services. More specifically, I discuss how the
manner in which nondiscrimination requirements on Internet-access
services may have an incentive effect that encourages carriers to offer
managed services outside of that regulated domain. By now, the
terms of the network neutrality debate are well known: whether and
to what extent government ought to supply rules that require the
providers of broadband connectivity to carry traffic equally, without
14
discrimination as to source, application, or content. The precedent
for network neutrality regulation was the nondiscrimination rule
applicable to traditional telephone services, a rule embodied in the
15
Communications Act and derived from the common law of common
16
carriage. The core of common carriage was the requirement to carry
all traffic equally, without any difference in service based on the
17
identity of the caller or the content of the communications. The
application of the nondiscrimination rule was relatively
uncontroversial for dial-up Internet service because that service was
provided over traditional telephone service.
But the cable companies, not the telephone companies, were the
18
vanguards of broadband Internet access in the United States. And
cable companies were not subject to common-carrier rules. Cable had
been conceived in the broadcast model, in which the distributor—the
station—chose the content to be provided. Indeed, the FCC’s
regulatory authority over cable television companies depended
initially on the view that cable was simply an extension of
broadcasting. The Communications Act forbade the regulation of

14. To be sure, the content of the nondiscrimination rule sought is contested, but that
debate need not be taken up here.
15. 47 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2006).
16. See James B. Speta, A Common Carrier Approach to Internet Interconnection, 53 FED.
COMM. L.J. 221, 258 (2002) (discussing the common law rule of nondiscrimination, as applied to
common carriers).
17. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated
Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1325 (1998) (describing nondiscrimination as the heart
of federal common-carrier regulation).
18. Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the
Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925, 928–29 (2001).
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broadcasters as common carriers, and the Supreme Court extended
20
this restriction to cable regulation. Despite the later statutory
addition of certain quasi-common-carriage obligations—such as must
carry and the obligation to provide public access, educational, and
governmental channels—the statute also replicated the prohibition on
21
common-carrier regulation of cable services. As the Supreme Court
22
put it in Turner Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, “Through ‘original
programming or by exercising editorial discretion over which stations
or programs to include in its repertoire,’ cable programmers and
operators ‘see[k] to communicate messages on a wide variety of
23
topics and in a wide variety of formats.’” That is, like broadcasters,
cable companies choose their own content, or, more precisely, they
choose the content that they offer to their customers.
As a legal matter, of course, this decision did not wholly resolve
the issue, for cable companies’ Internet services might or might not be
“cable services,” and the Act’s prohibition on common carrier
regulation extends only to cable services. If they were
telecommunications services, then common carrier rules would be
24
appropriate. In AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, AT&T argued that
its offering of a cable Internet service provider (ISP) was essentially
25
the same as its choosing a channel. Before the FCC took the
definitive position that cable-modem services were information
services under the Act, courts had rejected the notion that they were
cable services, principally because they did not meet the model of
26
operator selection of content.
That cable companies offered broadband services together with
their traditional video programming naturally had an effect on their

19. See 47 U.S.C. § 153(10) (“[A] person engaged in radio broadcasting shall not, insofar as
such person is so engaged, be deemed a common carrier.”).
20. See FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video II), 440 U.S. 689, 709 (1979)
(interpreting the Communications Act of 1934 to be inapplicable to cable companies).
21. 47 U.S.C. § 541(c) (“Any cable system shall not be subject to regulation as a common
carrier or utility by reason of providing any cable service.”).
22. Turner Broad. Corp. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
23. Id. at 636 (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Commc’ns, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494
(1986)).
24. AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2001).
25. Id. at 876.
26. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 979
(2005) (noting that the Ninth Circuit had previously rejected the FCC’s interpretation of the
Communications Act that cable internet services did not qualify as a telecommunications
service).
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incentives, although the FCC did not immediately acknowledge this
effect. The effect was partly economic and partly technical. As early
as 2001, advocates of cable open-access rules argued that cable
broadband providers would not permit broadband video services to
be deployed, because those services would compete against the cable
companies’ own video services: “Broadband is a potential competitor
to traditional cable video services. Traditional cable providers might
well view this competition as a long term threat to their business
27
model . . . .” What was largely unacknowledged in these arguments
was the (at least partial) artificiality of the incentive problem: In
traditional cable services, cable companies earned revenues both
from subscriber fees and from fees charged to content providers for
28
distribution. With Internet services, the bandwidth providers were
supposed to earn revenues only from subscriber revenues. If,
however, the cable companies were free to impose similar “access
charges . . . on ISPs and content providers” then they would be
indifferent—and would “maximize their profits” by allowing
customers to view whatever customers wanted to view the most,
“[e]ven if cable internet users [began] to watch internet video instead
29
of traditional cable programs.” Thus, the first interaction effect was
this: if Internet service did not allow cable operators to develop
business models that had traditionally been important to their overall
revenues and if those cable companies had a degree of market power,
they could indeed have the incentive to restrict the development of
Internet video, in one way or another.
Professors Thomas Hazlett and George Bittlingmayer extended
the interaction argument along a different vector, noting that cable
company actions that enhanced Internet video made DSL services
more desirable, making DSL more of a substitute not just for cable-

27. Written Ex Parte of Professor Mark A. Lemley and Professor Lawrence Lessig at 22,
Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214 Authorizations
from MediaOne Group, Inc., Transferor, to AT&T Corp. Transferee, 15 FCC Rcd. 9816 (2000),
suspended, 16 FCC Rcd. 5835 (2001) (CS Docket No. 99-251), available at http://cyber.law.
harvard.edu/works/lessig/lem-lesd.pdf.
28. This oversimplifies matters. In some cases, the cable companies have to pay the content
providers when the content is extremely popular. In most cases, the parties share the revenues
generated through advertising, either explicitly or implicitly by dividing the rights to program
commercials. See infra notes 122–26 and accompanying text.
29. James B. Speta, The Vertical Dimension of Cable Open Access, 71 U. COLO. L. REV.
975, 1005 (2000).
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modem service but also for cable television. As a result, cable
companies had an incentive to limit the bandwidth that they devoted
to Internet service: “A more vigorous transition by cable operators
could lead to the development of web-based services including videostreaming and other substitutes for networks now packaged by cable
system operators, exposing cable assets to intensified demands for
31
common carrier regulation.” Relatedly, cable companies had the
incentive to keep narrow their Internet-access bandwidth, to stunt the
growth of online video, and to protect their own video services. This
strategy, however, would not violate network neutrality rules because
it would starve the Internet pipe rather than discriminating among
sources available over the Internet.
When the FCC acted in the open-access debate and rejected calls
to unbundle cable-modem services or to subject those services to
common-carrier rules, the FCC did not address these incentive
arguments at all. For example, in the AT&T-TCI merger, when the
FCC first addressed the issue of open access, the Commission focused
principally on access requests by unaffiliated ISPs and “conclude[d]
that nothing about the proposed merger would deny any customer
(including AT&T-TCI customers) the ability to access the Internet
32
content or portal of his or her choice.” Although the parties also
sought conditions opening the cable services of the combined
company and enhancing the program-access rules, each of these
33
issues was presented on a stand-alone basis. As the AT&T cable
operation grew through its merger with MediaOne, some parties
became concerned that AT&T could negotiate exclusive
arrangements to content that would disadvantage other cable or
34
Direct Broadcast Satellite (DBS) companies. But the FCC
responded by simply noting its existing rules: “If parties believe any
existing exclusivity agreements violate the program access rules, the
30. Thomas W. Hazlett & George Bittlingmayer, The Political Economy of Cable “Open
Access,” 2003 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 4, ¶ 34.
31. Id.
32. Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214
Authorizations from Tele-Communications, Inc., Transferor, To AT&T Corp., Transferee, 14
FCC Rcd. 3160, 3207 (1999) (memorandum opinion and order).
33. See id. at 3176–77 (rejecting requests for access to TCI facilities to provide competing
multichannel video services); id. at 3179–80 (affirming that FCC program-access rules would
apply to the merged entity but refusing to go beyond those rules).
34. Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214
Authorizations from MediaOne Group, Inc., Transferor, To AT&T Corp. Transferee, 15 FCC
Rcd. 9816, 9854 (2000) (memorandum opinion and order).
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program access complaint process is the appropriate forum in which
35
to resolve any such grievance.” This fight was conducted solely on
the traditional, cable-television side of the house. As to Internet
services, the FCC refused to apply open-access conditions for two
reasons: First, it found “that there is significant actual and potential
competition from both alternative broadband providers and from
unaffiliated ISPs that may gain access to the merged firm’s cable
36
systems.” Second, AT&T committed to allow “[d]irect access to all
content available on the World Wide Web without any AT&T37
imposed charge to the consumer for such content.” In part, this
reflects a different state of the market, one in which the business
models of concern today—the integration of cable and broadband
and the provision of high-quality video content solely over the
Internet channel—had not yet developed.
As the late 1990s became the early and mid-2000s, this debate
38
over open access—renamed network neutrality —continued in both
39
the academy and the agency, with the FCC eventually issuing a
40
Policy Statement in which it adopted, at a high level, a commitment
to nondiscrimination. The FCC said that “consumers are entitled to
access the lawful Internet content of their choice” and that
“consumers are entitled to competition among network providers,
41
application and service providers, and content providers.” The
FCC’s statement was directed against Internet-carrier policies that
might have the effect of blocking or degrading content and not
against any similar practices in the traditional or managed services
42
realm.

35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Id. at 9866.
Id. at 9869–70.
See generally Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 141 (2003).
39. Compare Richard A. Epstein, Addison C. Harris Lecture, Intellectual Properties: Old
Boundaries and New Frontiers, 76 IND. L.J. 803, 818–19 (2001) (positing that open access is
suboptimal because the customary theories of private property and the commons in physical
space are capable of precise carryover to the Internet), with Yochai Benkler, Siren Songs and
Amish Children: Autonomy, Information, and Law, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 111 (2001)
(contending that frequency spectrum should be devoted to an open-access commons, rather
than commoditizing and auctioning it).
40. Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline Facilities,
20 FCC Rcd. 14,986 (2005) (policy statement).
41. Id. at 14,988.
42. See id. at 14,987 (directing the policy statement at “[i]nformation service providers”).
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The FCC’s Internet Policy Statement focused on the Internet
carriers’ ability to block traffic but did not itself state a theory of the
reasons that might motivate carriers to do so. That would finally
43
come, albeit incompletely, in the Comcast matter. In that case, the
FCC addressed complaints that Comcast had been secretly blocking
certain BitTorrent traffic on its Internet service. The FCC found that
“[w]hen Comcast judges that there are too many peer-to-peer
uploads in a given area, Comcast’s equipment terminates some of
44
those connections by sending RST [reset-the-connection] packets.”
The FCC’s reasoning finally cracked through the separate treatment
of traditional services and broadband service. Oddly, however, this
discussion came in the section of the decision in which the FCC was
defending its jurisdiction and not in the section of the opinion in
which it found Comcast’s practices unreasonable. Nevertheless, the
FCC now clearly had in mind that a cable company’s video services
could have an effect on its Internet platform actions. It said,
[I]f cable companies such as Comcast are barred from inhibiting
consumer access to high-definition on-line video content, then, as
discussed above, consumers with cable modem service will have
available a source of video programming (much of it free) that could
rapidly become an alternative to cable television. The competition
provided by this alternative should result in downward pressure on
cable television prices, which have increased rapidly in recent
45
years.

This reasoning was problematic for a number of reasons, most
particularly because the FCC did not find that Comcast had market
46
power. It did, however, reveal a more dynamic way of thinking
about the network neutrality problem, and it drew on the incentive

43. Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corporation
for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 FCC Rcd. 13,028 (2008) (memorandum
opinion and order), vacated, Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
44. Id. at 13,051.
45. Id. at 13,037.
46. For example, the complaint’s reasoning holds principally if Comcast exercises market
power, but the FCC did not find that Comcast has market power in any relevant market. See
James B. Speta, A Sensible Next Step on Network Neutrality: The Market Power Question, 8
REV. NETWORK ECON. 113, 121–23 (2009) (discussing the centrality of the market-power
question to this analysis).
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arguments being made in the literature, at least those by network
47
neutrality advocates.
Finally, at the same time its Comcast decision was on appeal, the
FCC began a rulemaking proceeding—the Open Internet
48
proceeding—to definitively address network neutrality. Here, the
FCC belatedly acknowledged the strong interaction between network
neutrality rules and the carriers’ incentives to maintain or deploy
managed services, doing so in strong terms despite ultimately taking
no action on these stated concerns. The initial notice of proposed
rulemaking (NPRM) raised the concern only in a general manner,
stating that “there are and will continue to be Internet Protocol–
based offerings (including voice and subscription video services, and
certain business services provided to enterprise customers), often
49
provided over the same networks.” Calling these “‘managed’ or
‘specialized’ services,” the Commission said that it was “sensitive to
any risk that the growth of managed or specialized services might
50
supplant or otherwise negatively affect the open Internet.” Its
request for comments, however, was very broad and general,
revealing no particular action that the FCC thought it might pursue.
To cure this gap, in September 2010, the FCC issued a supplementary
51
request for comments to fill in an inadequate record. The agency
then acknowledged that, through the unrestricted possibility of
managed services, “[o]pen Internet protections may be weakened if
broadband providers offer specialized services that are substantially
similar to, but do not technically meet the definition of, broadband
Internet access service, and if consumer protections do not apply to
52
such services.”
Reflecting the concern of Hazlett and
53
Bittlingmayer, the agency also said that providers might “constrict or
fail to continue expanding the network capacity allocated to

47. See Written Ex Parte of Professor Mark A. Lemley and Professor Lawrence Lessig,
supra note 27, at 36 (“[A]llowing the cable companies to . . . [monopolize] a competitive market
offers no guarantee of giving the appropriate incentive . . . .”).
48. See Preserving the Open Internet, 74 Fed. Reg. 62,638, 62,638 (proposed Nov. 30, 2009)
(to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 8) (“In this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), the
Commission considers adopting rules to preserve the open Internet.”).
49. Id. at 62,651.
50. Id.
51. Further Inquiry into Two Under-Developed Issues in the Open Internet Proceeding, 75
Fed. Reg. 55,297 (proposed Sept. 10, 2010) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. ch. I).
52. Id. at 55,299.
53. See supra text accompanying note 31.
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broadband Internet access service.” Finally, the FCC expressed its
concern over anticompetitive conduct, “particularly if [providers] are
55
vertically integrated providers of content, applications, or services.”
The Further Notice suggested several possible responses to these
56
concerns, including both regulatory and structural responses.
Despite these specifically noted concerns and despite the additional
call for comments, the final Open Internet Order did not impose any
57
restrictions on specialized services.
The last stage in this largely descriptive story is the recent
regulatory approval of the Comcast-NBC joint venture, in which both
the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the FCC subjected the
transaction to conditions designed specifically to address the
interaction between network neutrality regulation and the company’s
managed services. Although some vertical integration is present
between other distribution and content companies, the merger
presented such integration on a larger scale. Comcast is the biggest
cable company in the United States, and NBC is one of the leading
broadcast networks with one of the most extensive libraries of movies
58
(Universal Studios) and other programming. Under the transaction,
Comcast would acquire control of all of NBC Universal’s content
through a joint venture, while also contributing content of its own to
that venture. Although Comcast would initially share ownership of
the joint venture, it would both control it and have an option to
acquire the remaining equity from General Electric, NBC Universal’s
59
current owner.
The principal competition arguments present in the NBCComcast merger were straightforward vertical-foreclosure stories, in
which Comcast might use its newfound control over desirable content
to disadvantage competitors, and both the FCC and the DOJ imposed
conditions on the merger designed to meet those threats. In the first
version of the anticompetition story, Comcast would deny other

54. Further Inquiry into Two Under-Developed Issues, 75 Fed. Reg. at 55,299.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Preserving the Open Internet: Broadband Industry Practices, 25 FCC Rcd. 17,905, 52
Commc’ns Reg. (P & F) 1, 35–36 (Dec. 21, 2010) (report and order).
58. See Applications of Comcast Corp., General Electric Co., and NBC Universal, Inc. for
Consent to Assign Licenses and Transfer Control of Licenses, 52 Commc’ns Reg. (P & F) 249,
253–54 (2011) (memorandum opinion and order) (describing the sizes, business interests, and
holdings of the three companies).
59. Id. at 254–55.
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multichannel video-program distributors (MVPDs) access to
desirable content, or alternatively charge very high prices, putting
them at a disadvantage for subscribers. Comcast has denied access to
its regional sports network in Philadelphia, for example, to competing
satellite and cable providers, and the merger, it was argued, would
60
create a greater incentive for it to do so more generally. Critics of
the deal also suggested that Comcast would have the same incentive
to deny content to online video providers, which would compete with
Comcast’s traditional services and which would be available over any
61
broadband medium.
To respond to these concerns, the DOJ Antitrust Division and
the FCC each imposed conditions on the merger. Comcast will be
required to provide any content in the joint venture to any MVPD if
that content is provided to any other MVPD, including Comcast
itself. Additionally, the FCC imposed a baseball-arbitration regime to
62
resolve any disputes over licensing fees. This regime, based upon
similar remedies applied in previous mergers, takes account of the
combination of content and distribution assets. As to online video,
the conditions were more elaborate, and they were based on a strong

60. See id. at 260 (stating that conditions imposed on the transaction are “consistent with
our previous finding that Comcast’s withholding of the terrestrially delivered Comcast
SportsNet Philadelphia RSN from DBS operators caused the percentage of television
households subscribing to DBS in Philadelphia to be 40 percent lower than what it otherwise
would have been”).
61. See, e.g., Mark Cooper, Structured Viral Communications: The Political Economy and
Social Organization of Digital Disintermediation, 9 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 15, 46,
46 n.107 (2011) (detailing this argument and providing an account of online video providers’
anxieties regarding the Comcast-NBC merger); see also Comments of Netflix, Inc. at 6,
Preserving the Open Internet, 52 Commc’ns Reg. (P & F) 1 (GN Docket No. 09-191, WC
Docket No. 07-52), available at https://prodnet.www.neca.org/publicationsdocs/wwpdf/
0114netflix.pdf (arguing that the Comcast-NBC merger will exacerbate the potential problem of
video providers using their gatekeeper control over programming networks and broadband
access to stifle competition and discriminate against outside content); Yinka Adegoke, Web TV
Could Come with a Price Tag After Comcast-NBC, REUTERS, Oct. 4, 2009, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5942UI20091005 (expressing concern over the
anticompetitive effects that would flow from Comcast’s having a vested interest in Hulu’s
future).
62. Applications of Comcast Corp., General Electric Co., and NBC Universal, Inc., 52
Commc’ns Reg. (P & F) at 270. Baseball arbitration is shorthand for final-offer arbitration, in
which the arbitrator is constrained to choose one of the parties’ final proposals instead of being
free to fashion the solution that the arbitrator may perceive to be best. Baseball arbitration may
shift some bargaining power to weaker parties. See generally James R. Chelius & James B.
Dworkin, An Economic Analysis of Final-Offer Arbitration as a Conflict Resolution Device, 24 J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 293, 296 (1980).
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finding that online video presented an important source of potential
competition to cable:
When measured by the number of customers who are cordshaving or cord-cutting [i.e., downgrading or eliminating their
traditional cable service], OVDs [online video distributors] currently
have a de minimis share of the video programming distribution
market. Their current market share, however, greatly understates
their potential competitive significance in this market. Whether
viewers buy individual or a combination of OVD services, OVDs
are likely to continue to develop into better substitutes for MVPD
63
video services.

The conditions were designed to protect these nascent competitors.
First, Comcast is required to provide video to any online provider on
64
the same terms that it provides the video to an MVPD. This
condition, although placing OVDs on the same footing as MVPDs, is
unlikely to appeal to the core OVD business model because it
essentially requires the OVD to offer the content in the same linearprogramming format as do cable and satellite companies. As the DOJ
acknowledges, online video generally does not follow a linear format:
“One reason for the dramatic growth of online distribution is the
increased consumer interest in on-demand viewing, especially among
younger viewers who have grown up with the Internet, and are
accustomed to viewing video at a time and on a device of their
65
choosing.”
The second condition has more teeth: the joint venture will be
required to license to any OVD “broadcast, cable, or film content
comparable in scope and quality to the content the OVD receives
66
from one of the [joint venture]’s programming peers.” This
benchmarked solution is designed to ensure that the joint venture
behaves in the same manner that a programmer without an interest in
distribution would behave. Additionally, Comcast is required to hold
only equity—not voting or operational control—in Hulu and must
continue to provide Hulu the same type of programming that NBC
67
Universal currently does.

63. Competitive Impact Statement at 18, United States v. Comcast Corp., No. 1:11-cv00106 (D.D.C. Jan. 18, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f266100/266158.pdf.
64. Id. at 31–32.
65. Id. at 15.
66. Id. at 31.
67. Id. at 26, 33–34.
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The most open-ended of the content restrictions has to do with
exclusive licensing practices. The DOJ acknowledged that exclusive
68
licensing arrangements can sometimes be procompetitive. Content
providers often use exclusive distribution arrangements in order to
segment the market—to price-discriminate—which many hold is
important to assure adequate returns in content industries and which,
69
in any event, is a customary practice. With the merger, the DOJ was
concerned about both the joint venture’s use of its content through
exclusive licensing and Comcast’s use of its power in the cable
distribution market to require content-providers to offer exclusive
deals, either of which could injure Comcast’s distribution competitors.
Thus, the Consent Decree limits both the joint venture and Comcast
to “reasonable and customary exclusivity provisions,” benchmarked
against the exclusivity practices of the most comparable distribution
70
and content providers.
The Consent Decree also imposed conditions on Comcast’s
offering of “specialized services,” which fall within the umbrella of
71
managed services. The Decree defined specialized service as every
service offered by Comcast, except to the extent those services are
regulated as telecommunications or cable services or are themselves
Internet Access Services. As to Internet Access Services, the Decree
72
imposes a network neutrality provision. The agencies forbade
Comcast from developing a specialized service consisting of only
joint-venture content, to prevent the circumvention of the other
73
content requirements and of the network neutrality rule. Similarly,

68. Id. at 34–35.
69. See id. (“The video programming distribution industry frequently uses exclusive
contract terms that can be procompetitive.”).
70. Id. at 36.
71. See [Proposed] Final Judgment at 7, United States v. Comcast Corp., No. 1:11-cv-00106
(D.D.C. Jan. 18, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f266100/266160.pdf (defining
a specialized service as “any service provided over the same last-mile facilities used to deliver
Internet Access Service other than (1) Internet Access Services, (2) services regulated either as
telecommunications services under Title II of the Communications Act or as MVPD services
under Title VI of the Communications Act, or (3) Defendants’ existing VoIP telephony
service”).
72. See Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 63, at 38 (“Section V.G.1 of the
proposed Final Judgment prohibits Comcast from unreasonably discriminating in the
transmission of lawful traffic over its Internet access service, with the proviso that reasonable
network management practices do not constitute unreasonable discrimination.”).
73. Id. at 38–39 (“If Comcast were to offer online video services through Specialized
Services, however, it could effectively avoid the prohibitions [on network neutrality and content
distribution].”).
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they required Comcast to provide other OVDs access to specialized
74
services if Comcast offered an OVD service as a specialized service.
Finally, in order to ensure that Comcast could not limit
bandwidth across the board, thus restricting competition while still
complying with the network neutrality provision, the agencies
required Comcast to “maintain its public Internet access service at a
level that typically would allow any user on the network to download
content from the public Internet at speeds of at least 12 megabits per
75
second in markets where it has deployed DOCSIS 3.0.” The
Department of Justice said, “These speeds are sufficient to ensure
that Comcast’s Internet access services can support the development
of OVDs as well as other services that are potentially competitive
76
with Comcast’s own offerings.”
II. THE EDGE OF ONLINE BUSINESS MODELS
The NBC-Comcast merger therefore brought to the forefront
competition issues that had long been ignored in the network
neutrality debate specifically and in the broader discussion of how
traditional regulation should transition to a new generation of
Internet regulation. The merger did this both because of the scale and
scope of the merger and because it implicated emerging online
business models that parties thought the merged company might
replicate. These business models demonstrate the content of the
competition problems but also, I suggest, demonstrate the
fundamental problems of service-specific approaches to competition
problems in information policy. In this Part, after a brief detour into
some basics of media economics, I take up three case studies of online
video distribution: Hulu, the broadcasters’ joint venture; ESPN3.com,
the online sports-video service owned by Disney’s ESPN, the 800pound gorilla of video; and the cable companies’ own TV Everywhere
product. These case studies help frame the regulatory response to
date, but they are not the end of the story. This section concludes
with some speculation concerning the next frame of Internet services,
services that might be offered as “specialized services” and thereby
re-envision all of the debates to date.

74. Id. at 39.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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A. Some Basic Video Economics
Video creation and distribution is one of the biggest industries in
the United States, and it has been for more than half a century; it is
also one of the few industries in which the United States continues to
77
have a positive trade balance. Yet the economics of it are tricky, and
at both the production and distribution levels, the economics have
resulted in a fair degree of government intervention. Copyright, of
course, governs production, and the government has regulated
broadcasting through spectrum licensing and cable through
franchising, rate regulation, and a variety of other techniques. For
present purposes, the economics of the regulation are less important
than the industry strategies that have grown up around video, in
response to both the difficult economics of video and to the
regulation itself.
Here, I briefly describe what should be familiar to any video
consumer—and Americans are almost uniformly huge consumers of
78
video. Video producers and distributors each rely on various
practices to segment audiences and engage in effective pricediscrimination in order to increase total revenues. Video producers
rely on “windowing”—the practice of releasing a video through
different distribution channels at different times, with various periods
of exclusivity. Distributors similarly rely on windowing, tiering,
bundling, and other practices to maximize revenues. Producers and
distributors negotiate to share in the revenues created by these
business practices; they are cooperative in that the provision of the
video experience to the ultimate consumer requires producers and

77. See Martha Bayles, The Return of Cultural Diplomacy, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 31, 2008,
http://www.newsweek.com/2008/12/31/the-return-of-cultural-diplomacy.html (“The Bureau of
Economic Analysis reports that between 1986 and 2005, foreign sales of U.S. motion-picture
and video products rose from $1.91 billion to $10.4 billion (in 2005 dollars)—an increase of 444
percent. As Dan Glickman, president of the Motion Picture Association says, ‘Among all the
sectors of the U.S. economy, our industry is the only one that generates a positive balance of
trade in every country in which it does business.’ The same is true for the TV and music
industries, and the reach is far greater when piracy is figured in.”).
78. See Megan O’Neill, The Average American Watches 30 Minutes of Online Video vs 5
Hours of TV per Day, SOCIAL TIMES (Nov. 17, 2010, 9:30 AM), http://www.socialtimes.com/
2010/11/online-video-consumption (“While 30 minutes of online video a day may pale in
comparison to the 5 hours of television that the average American watches on a daily basis . . . it
still shows the rapid rate at which online video is growing.”); TV, Internet and Mobile Usage in
U.S. Continues to Rise, NIELSEN WIRE (Feb. 23, 2009), http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/
online_mobile/tv-internet-and-mobile-usage-in-us-continues-to-rise (“[T]he average American
watches 151 hours of TV per month . . . .”).
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distributors to act jointly, but they are adversarial in that they are
79
negotiating over their respective shares of the surplus produced.
Internet video, especially Internet piracy, has put substantial pressure
on windowing practices, shortening windows and changing the
importance of different types of distribution channels. The parties’
negotiations are also affected by the transition from traditional modes
of production and channels of distribution to the era of Internet
video.
Producers of television programs and movies “discriminate
among audiences by releasing their products at different times
80
(windows) and in different distribution channels.” In windowing, the
producer balances a variety of factors in trying to maximize
profitability, although the essential issue is “forc[ing] buyers to sort
themselves out according to how much they are willing to pay for the
81
film or program close to its original release date.” In 1989, a movie
might have had a six-year period over which it was released to as
many as nine different distribution channels, including domestic
theaters (first and second run), overseas theaters, home video
(domestic then overseas), first cable run (usually premium), broadcast
networks (domestic then overseas), second cable run, and then
82
syndication to local television. The availability of windowing to
increase profitability has a feedback effect on the production market:
“The tendency of windowing to increase production budgets favors
the producers of programs that are suitable for windowing. Producers
of programs for which there is likely to be a continuing demand can,
83
and do, spend more to produce their programs.”

79. See CHARLES B. GOLDFARB, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34078, RETRANSMISSION
CONSENT AND OTHER FEDERAL RULES AFFECTING PROGRAMMER-DISTRIBUTOR
NEGOTIATIONS: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 9 (2007) (“Despite all these complexities, the
relationships among content producer, programmer, and distributor are characterized by mutual
need—both the content producer and the programmer need distributors that have direct contact
with the potential audience; the distributor needs content producers and programmers with
good content to attract subscribers. At the same time, there is an inherent tension as each seeks
to capture the lion’s share of the value that consumers place on the content.”).
80. BRUCE M. OWEN & STEVEN S. WILDMAN, VIDEO ECONOMICS 29 (1992).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 30 tbl.2.2 (citing A Survey of the Entertainment Industry, ECONOMIST (SPECIAL
REP.), Dec. 23, 1989, at 5).
83. Id. at 49.
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The modern era has seen a shift in windowing practices,
although the practice has remained fundamental in most video
markets. The channels of distribution have shifted, with several new
channels becoming important, frequently to the detriment of other
channels. Home video distribution—videotape and then DVD—
85
became increasingly important, but then it began to wane as online
distribution became more important. Accelerated release dates for
home video reduced the length of first-run theater releases and
decreased revenues for releases that occurred after the DVD releases.
Video-on-demand products from traditional cable companies provide
a channel quite similar to release on tape or DVD. Online
distribution of television shows is now quite common, and online
distribution both changes the primacy of broadcasters in the
distribution chain and changes the market for DVD collections
released after the season concludes. Online distribution has not
eliminated the DVD channel because of the instability of online
models and the lower quality of video. But revenues in the DVD
86
segment are definitely down.
Some of the shift in distribution windows has been driven, of
course, by the rise of a distribution channel that is not part of the
87
producers’ business model—online piracy. It is hard to “compete
with free,” and studios and others attribute accelerated distribution
schedules that greatly reduce the periods of exclusivity, especially to
theaters, to the need to provide an alternative to viewing illegally
88
copied movies on the Internet. Such pirated copies are widely

84. Jason Kilar, Here Are My Thoughts on Hulu and the Future of TV, BUS. INSIDER (Feb.
3, 2011, 6:37 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/jason-kilar-here-are-my-thoughts-on-huluand-the-future-of-tv-2011-2 (positing that recent innovations in windowing will continue).
85. Mark A. Lemley, Is the Sky Falling on the Content Industries?, 9 J. ON TELECOMM. &
HIGH TECH. L. 125, 128–29 (2011) (detailing the evolution of the home video platform from an
industry-perceived nuisance to a multibillion-dollar, industry-sustaining revenue stream).
86. See, e.g., Tim Arango, Viacom Profit and Revenue Decline as DVD Sales Drop, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 4, 2011, at B4 (noting the significant decline in DVD revenues); Brooks Barnes,
Who Threw the DVD from the Train?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2009, at BU4 (same).
87. See David A. Cook & Wenli Wang, Neutralizing the Piracy of Motion Pictures:
Reengineering the Industry’s Supply Chain, 26 TECH. SOC’Y 567, 568 (2004) (detailing how
millions of dollars of losses resulting from online piracy have motivated content industries to
address their online distribution capabilities).
88. See, e.g., Shujen Wang, Recontextualizing Copyright: Piracy, Hollywood, the State, and
Globalization, 43 CINEMA J. 25, 30 (2003) (“Speed becomes a major goal of, and a challenge to,
participants in the global informational structure. Speed is also one of the factors determining
the success and prevalence of the piracy networks. Viewed in this context, the windowing
strategies practiced by Hollywood help manage time and control speed through space so as to
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available very soon after—and sometimes before—theatrical
89
release. The early release to video is meant to capture the audience
that does not go to the theater but, given the easily accessible online
90
copies, will not wait a long time for a cheaper release window.
Although it has not eliminated piracy online, earlier release to DVD
and now earlier release to online streaming services create an
alternative revenue stream—just as iTunes and similar services did
for music sales.
The Comcast-NBC merger, it was thought, also created
opportunities for further changes to windowing practices. It was
obvious that Comcast would “use Universal’s vast film library to
91
expand its own video-on-demand opportunities.” But commentators
on the merger also speculated that Comcast might “break what has
been a taboo in the movie business: allowing consumers to watch a
92
film at home while it is still being shown in theaters.” As in many
cases of channel evolution, the prospects for such a change would not
only depend on the profits to the producers of the video, but would
also be subject to a negotiation with other stakeholders in other
channels which, although perhaps less important, would not be
irrelevant. For example, enhancing video on demand “may
cannibalize DVD sales or offend important retailers like Wal-Mart[,
the nation’s biggest seller of DVDs; m]ultiplex owners might also be
93
skittish.” Renegotiating rights windows that have already been
granted and, more generally, simply assuaging long-standing partners

minimize the threat posed by new technologies. Despite these efforts, however, technologically
savvy pirates and their ever-more-efficient and flexible networks have seriously undermined the
studios’ control.”); see also Cook & Wang, supra note 87, at 569 (“[W]e believe that a more
effective approach to neutralizing piracy of motion pictures is to reengineer the industry’s
supply chain in such a way that it can offer legal, cheaper, more convenient, and more enjoyable
entertainment than anything illicit copies can provide.”).
89. See, e.g., Anna E. Engelman & Dale A. Scott, Arrgh! Hollywood Targets Internet
Piracy, 11 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 3, 59 (2004) (“Today, a movie can be downloaded in hours, for
free, and burned onto DVD before it is in theaters.”).
90. As evidence of iTunes’s increasing value to music content industries, consider its 2008
press release indicating that it had surpassed Wal-Mart as the leading music retailer in the
United States. Press Release, Apple, iTunes Store Top Music Retailer in the US (Apr. 2, 2008),
available at http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2008/04/03itunes.html.
91. Lauren A.E. Schuker, Comcast May Test New ‘Windows’ for Movies on Cable, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 3, 2009, at B9.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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has been one of the hurdles to overcome in the development of new
94
online video distribution models.
Program distributors such as cable television companies also
engage in well-known practices to segment audiences. Premium tiers
and premium channels attract customers with high willingness to pay
for niche programming—and the offerings are nearly unlimited,
ranging from premium movie channels, to out-of-market sports
channels, to overseas news and entertainment channels. Video-ondemand products attract consumers with higher willingness to pay for
particular programming—willingness to pay that can come from the
desire to see a show either sooner or later, as video-on-demand
movies are sometimes released earlier than through other channels
while video-on-demand television viewing allows a viewer to miss the
95
show’s regular broadcast. As channel capacity and addressability
have both improved, cable companies can merge premium offerings
into combinations of linear programming and video on demand.
The obvious use of tiering for premium offerings, including not
just packages of premium channels but also the offering of individual
channels, has in part raised the question of why cable companies and
other MVPDs do not sell all of their channels on an à la carte basis.
The push for à la carte cable services has multiple rationales,
including audience members who seek such a requirement in order to
96
limit their exposure to what they view as harmful content. But as an
economic matter, the argument is that consumers are being forced to
pay for programming that they do not want when the lowest tier
available, other than a broadcast-only tier, comes with dozens of
channels, most of which any given consumer does not watch. As
former FCC Chairman Kevin Martin contended,
Channel choice is increasingly significant to consumers as the
number of channels included in expanded basic, and the
corresponding price to consumers, has continued to skyrocket . . . .
Indeed, cable rates have more than doubled in the last ten years.
Cable companies often point to the increased number of channels
being offered as an explanation for the increase in prices. This
94. See generally Adam Webb, Viewing Rights, NEW MEDIA AGE, Mar. 8, 2007, at 23
(discussing the issues surrounding traditional media companies distributing video online).
95. Producers and distributors are still trying to figure out how (and if) consumers will pay
for the value of time-shifting. See infra text accompanying notes 96–98.
96. E.g., John Rash, Editorial, Rash Report: MTV’s ‘Skins’ Bares Public-Policy Divisions,
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Feb. 5, 2011, at 9A (holding out à la carte cable as a way parents
could easily control what shows their children watch).
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explanation, however, ignores the fact that most of these channels
97
are not actually being watched.

Some economics research has suggested modest savings to consumers
98
would result from offering channels à la carte, but those would
certainly not be pro rata savings.
The best explanation for bundling at the basic tier is the same
low-marginal-cost problem faced generally in content industries.
Here, the cable companies have a very low marginal cost for
providing consumers with additional channels, and a relatively higher
cost of developing the infrastructure necessary to separate channels
and separately bill for them. Customers purchase the package that
includes the individual channels they want to view, at a price they are
99
willing to pay, and, in general, they are indifferent to whether the
100
package also comes with channels they do not want. Bundling is a
common practice in many industries in which the consumer is in the
101
best position to select from a menu of related goods. In the cable

97. FCC’s Martin Supports ‘A La Carte’ Cable Plans, PCMAG.COM (Aug. 22, 2007, 4:51
PM), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2174261,00.asp (quoting Martin).
98. See, e.g., CHARLES B. GOLDFARB, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33338, THE FCC’S “A
LA CARTE” REPORTS 2 (2006) (noting that one of two FCC reports on à la carte pricing
concluded that “a la carte purchasing is likely to lower the monthly bill” of cable subscribers
who already receive digital cable); Gregory S. Crawford & Joseph Cullen, Bundling, Product
Choice, and Efficiency: Should Cable Television Networks Be Offered à la Carte?, 19 INFO.
ECON. & POL’Y 379, 402 (2007) (“[I]n a ‘Full À La Carte’ world, if all networks continue to be
offered, average per-household consumers surplus is estimated to increase [by 65.6%].”).
99. See Thomas W. Hazlett, Shedding Tiers for a la Carte? An Economic Analysis of Cable
TV Pricing, 5 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 253, 257 (2006) (“A household subscribes to
basic cable if and only if the value they place on the programming they desire to watch exceeds
the retail price. That is true even though no customer watches every channel, but only their own
customized sub-set of programs. Effectively, the consumer subscribes to realize their individual
preferences, and the cable company tosses in the additional channels for free.”).
100. Those viewers who have objections to the content of the channels they do not want to
view (and may fear members of their household inadvertently viewing) may have a negative
value for the presence of those channels in their bundle. The policy question is whether those
objections are best met through the regulation of cable systems to require à la carte sales or to
enable—or mandate—premises-driven blocking technologies. The major cable companies
provide premises-based technology and also allow customers to request the blocking of
channels. See id. at 284–85 (“Individual subscribers can remove unwanted programming from
appearing on their home television screens. . . . On a targeted basis, individual households are
able to remove programming, gaining utility and incurring only modest costs. . . . Channel
blocking is relatively simple when using a television set with a digital set-top box. . . . Advanced
analog set-top boxes also have channel blocking capabilities . . . .”).
101. See, e.g., Joseph P. Guiltinan, The Price of Bundling of Services: A Normative
Framework, 51 J. MARKETING 74, 74 (1987) (“Broadly defined, bundling is the practice of
marketing two or more products and/or services in a single ‘package’ for a special price.
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context, some people also assert that it reduces the overall costs of
production and distribution because programmers are not required to
102
engage in the advertising necessary to gain initial subscribers.
All of a distributor’s practices are finalized in a negotiation with
the program owner, a negotiation that divides pricing issues and
distribution over a number of dimensions. Distribution companies
sometimes pay program owners directly, sending a portion of monthly
subscriber revenues directly to the program owner, when the program
content is particularly important. The program owner and the
distributor can also share the right to place advertising on the
programming and thereby share in the advertising revenue generated
by the programming. This practice allows dollars to flow in the other
103
direction, from programmer to distributor.
The parties also
negotiate over the distribution practices. In one of the more famous
examples, Disney used its control over ABC and ESPN
programming—two very valuable properties that cable companies
cannot really do without—to negotiate to move the Disney Channel
to the expanded-basic tier, which then created the outlet for the
104
tween-programming boom. One can dispute the social utility of
105
106
and Hannah Montana, but the negotiation
Lizzie McGuire
demonstrates the powerful position that channel placement has in

Certainly this practice is not new to the field of marketing. For years, firms in a number of
industries have used such tactics as the block-booking of a set of movies and the sale of
maintenance contracts with computer hardware.”). For other examples of bundling, see id.
102. See Hazlett, supra note 99, at 282.
103. See GOLDFARB, supra note 79, at 18–19 (discussing the multiple dimensions of
negotiations between networks and cable distributors); Harry Berkowitz, For Cable TV, Change
Adds Up, NEWSDAY, Apr. 11, 2007, at A7 (noting the specific example of ESPN raising fees to
cable companies, but also noting that “[t]he network says it has provided extra advertising time
to cable operators as a way to make up for the extra expense and that it has little choice but to
pay what sports leagues demand”).
104. See Time Warner, Disney Sign Long-Term Retransmission Deal, COMM. DAILY, May
26, 2000, available at Factiva, Doc. comd000020010804dw5q001ja (“Settling their nasty, very
public feud over retransmission consent rights, Time Warner and Disney signed a long-term
deal Thurs. that will keep ABC on MSO’s cable systems for another 6 years. In what seemed to
be capitulation of Time Warner to Disney’s demands, MSO also agreed to switch Disney
Channel from pay to basic tier over [the] next 3 years, extend and expand carriage of 4 ESPN
networks and carry 2 fledgling Disney cable networks, Toon Disney and SoapNet.”).
105. Lizzie McGuire (Disney Channel television series 2001–04).
106. Hannah Montana (Disney Channel television series 2006–11). One cannot question
their economic utility, however: the television series Hannah Montana received a weekly
audience in excess of 2.4 million viewers in a highly desirable economic category. See Peter
Sanders, Disney Revs Up Tween Star Machine, WALL ST. J., June 17, 2008, at B1.
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negotiations between content producers and cable companies, just as
it does in other distribution channels.
In sum, video producers and distributors both face the problem
of very high fixed costs and very low marginal costs. Hollywood
movies and high-value television programming are expensive to
produce, but the audience can be expanded at essentially zero cost.
Constructing a cable or fiber optic network is very expensive, but,
once built, serving additional customers and providing additional
107
content is a very low-cost proposition.
In this environment,
economic theory dictates that, if possible, the owners and distributors
108
of content will each seek price-discrimination strategies. In video
production, this has long resulted in windowing—the use of different
distribution channels, each with a degree of exclusivity, to segment
109
audiences based on their willingness to pay. And distributors use
tiering and other premium offerings such as video on demand to
effect similar strategies.
B. Online Video Business Models
I now turn to describe three different online video providers,
each of which has a different manner in which its system is “closed,”
to illustrate both the evolving business models and the interaction
between these new models and traditional windowing and

107. See, e.g., Daniel Brenner, Cable Television and the First Amendment: Theory and
Praxis, in CABLE TELEVISION LAW 1990: REVISITING THE CABLE ACT 537, 568 n.128 (PLI
Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks & Literary Prop., Course Handbook Ser. No. 386, 1990)
(noting that, even in 1990, although start-up construction costs were substantial, fiber optic
systems required lower maintenance costs, which in the long run minimized the economic
impact of the original investment).
108. See David W. Barnes, The Incentives/Access Tradeoff, 9 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP.
96, 62 (2010) (noting that content creators and providers in all fields of intellectual property are
sometimes incentivized and able, through licensing practices, to engage in price discrimination);
see also Vartan J. Saravia, Shades of Gray: The Internet Market of Copyrighted Goods and a Call
for the Expansion of the First-Sale Doctrine, 15 SW. J. INT’L L. 383, 397 (2009) (positing that in
the realm of intellectual property there is a strong pull toward price-discrimination strategies
because, given the necessary originality of individual works, none of the products are “perfect
substitutes for each other, and because either by law or by contract, the copyright owners may
prevent or limit the arbitrage opportunities for resellers”).
109. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450 (7th Cir. 1996) (“To make price
discrimination work, however, the seller must be able to control arbitrage. . . . A producer of
movies segments the market by time, releasing first to theaters, then to pay-per-view services,
next to the videotape and laserdisc market, and finally to cable and commercial tv.”).
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110

distribution. These models also demonstrate how new video, no less
than old video, depends on discrimination of different kinds. These
tensions, which are inherent in a technological transition, in part
create the competition problems that have come to the forefront
through the Comcast-NBC merger. The three online video operations
are Hulu, which is a joint venture of three leading broadcasters;
ESPN3.com, the online arm of the single biggest sports video
distributor; and TV Everywhere, an evolving joint venture of the
cable companies to provide online video access to their own cable
subscribers. Hulu is closed in the sense that much content is made
available only by subscription. It is perhaps the least remarkable and
least controversial offering, although there has been some
controversy. ESPN3.com is closed in that subscription to the service is
made via ISP, not directly to the consumer, and ESPN will not sell the
service to individual consumers whose ISPs do not subscribe. Finally,
TV Everywhere is closed because only customers of the cable
companies that sponsor the service are permitted access, and access is
tied to a subscription to traditional cable service. TV Everywhere is
not available to other customers on a purchased basis.
Hulu is perhaps the best known of these video services. Founded
in 2007, Hulu is co-owned by three of the four major broadcast
networks (NBCUniversal, News Corporation, and Disney), together
111
with Hulu management and a private equity firm. Hulu licenses
content from Fox, MGM, and many other content providers. Hulu is
a leading aggregator of television programming, programming that
previously was available directly from programmers’ websites or not
available at all. At first, Hulu was an entirely advertising-supported
site, with all content freely available, including both recently
broadcast content and archives of prior television seasons and
112
movies. This model did not, however, generate revenues similar to
those generated by over-the-air viewing, and the content owners

110. For a more general discussion of the online video market, raised in the different
context of copyright policy, see generally Marvin Ammori, Copyright’s Latest Communications
Policy: Content-Lock-Out and Compulsory Licensing for Internet Television, 18 COMMLAW
CONSPECTUS 375 (2010).
111. See About, HULU, http://www.hulu.com/about (last visited Apr. 5, 2011).
112. See Thanks, Me Hearties, ECONOMIST, July 19, 2008, at 74 (noting that, at the time,
Hulu offered free, advertising-supported video streaming).
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became “[w]orried that free Web versions of their biggest TV shows
113
[were] eating into their traditional business.”
The owners’ traditional distribution partners contributed to this
pressure. “[T]he networks were becoming increasingly insistent about
seeking monthly fees from cable and satellite operators who used
their broadcast signals. . . . [I]n tense negotiations, the cable and
satellite operators had a big objection: Why would we pay you for
114
content you make available free on the web?” In part as a result of
those pressures, Hulu has begun a subscription service for most of its
content—Hulu Plus. In order to access all but the most recent
television shows, as well as some other, less desirable content,
115
customers have to pay $7.99 a month. This has apparently enabled
Hulu to license additional content, and it recently announced that
116
Viacom content is returning.
The manner in which Hulu has closed its service is
unremarkable, even on an Internet that generally values openness.
Many content owners have tried to establish subscription-based
businesses, although not nearly as many of them have actually
succeeded. The Wall Street Journal is the only domestic newspaper
that has proved able to keep most of its content available only by
subscription, although the New York Times is beginning a second
117
attempt at an online subscription service. Internet music sites
floundered for some time after the first (illegal) incarnation of
118
119
Napster, and iTunes, the first success story, is really more of a

113. Sam Schechner & Jessica E. Vascellaro, Hulu Reworks Its Script as Digital Change Hits
TV, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2011, at A1.
114. Id.
115. See Hulu Plus, HULU, http://www.hulu.com/plus (last visited Apr. 5, 2011).
116. See Jason Kilar, Stewart, Colbert, and Hulu’s Thoughts About the Future of TV, HULU
BLOG (Feb. 2, 2011), http://blog.hulu.com/2011/02/02/stewart-colbert-and-hulus-thoughts-aboutthe-future-of-tv/.
117. See Arthur Sulzberger, A Letter to Our Readers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2011, at A26;
Richard Pérez-Peña, Times to Stop Charging for Parts of Its Website, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2007,
at C2.
118. See, e.g., Bob Tedeschi, Music at Your Fingertips, but a Battle Among Those Selling It to
You, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2003, at C21 (detailing the number of online music retailers that had
sprung up in the aftermath of Napster, and pointing out that, in 2003, Apple’s director for
marketing of applications and services claimed it was “hard to make money selling music
downloads,” and that iTunes was only “close to break-even”).
119. As evidence of iTunes’s considerable success, consider its 2008 press release indicating
that it had surpassed Wal-Mart as the leading music retailer in the United States. Press Release,
Apple, supra note 90.
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120

purchase-based application than a web service. In the online video
space, Netflix’s online subscription service has boomed, to the point
where some estimate that it represents 20 percent of the downstream
121
traffic on the Internet during peak hours. But no one really objects
when content owners attempt to capitalize on the value of their
copyrights by requiring payment, whether based on subscription or
one-time charges, for their content.
ESPN3.com is perhaps less well known than Hulu, but it has a
very devoted following. Sports programming in general is high-value
122
programming and, although much of the content available on
ESPN3.com is niche programming that does not have wide enough
appeal to justify its being shown on traditional cable channels, the
ESPN management claims that the viewership is intensely
123
interested. Its business model is to license subscriptions to ISPs and
124
then to provide access only to the customers of those ISPs. In other
words, it is replicating the cable model:
ESPN’s attempt to get ISPs to foot the bill is commonplace in the
cable and satellite TV world, in which the likes of Comcast and
DirecTV pay a per-subscriber fee to ESPN for its programming. On
the Internet, it’s a different story. End-users are expected to foot the
bill for such premium services, either via a subscription or pay-per125
view model.

Those ISPs that have subscribed echo a similar theme: Verizon, in
particular, was an early adopter, with a spokesman saying, “It’s a

120. See, e.g., Tedeschi, supra note 118 (quoting Apple’s director for marketing of
applications and services as stating that “one reason Apple was in the [online music] business
was to drive sales of its iPod music player and to help the company position itself as a cuttingedge brand”).
121. Sara Yin, Netflix Eats Up 20 Percent of U.S. Downstream Bandwidth, PCMAG.COM
(Oct. 21, 2010, 5:45 PM EST), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2371260,00.asp.
122. See Diana Moss, Regional Sports Networks, Competition, and the Consumer, 21 LOY.
CONSUMER L. REV. 56, 56–57 (2008) (“[Regional sports networks] are hugely profitable, with
margins estimated at 30 to 40 percent and average fees of $2 per subscriber, second only to the
Entertainment and Sports Programming Network’s (ESPN) fees of $2.50 per subscriber.”).
123. See Hiawatha Bray, ESPN Selling Premium Content to Net Providers, BOS. GLOBE,
June 15, 2006, at D1 (noting that ESPN is “really talking about high-quality premium content
that a lot of consumers have a demand for” (quoting Tanya Van Court, vice president and
general manager of new media products at ESPN)).
124. Eliot Van Buskirk, ESPN to ISPs: Pay for Your Customers to Play Video, WIRED
EPICENTER (Feb. 5, 2009, 5:18 PM), http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2009/02/espn-stands-fir.
125. Eric Bangeman, ESPN Charging ISPs to Carry ESPN360, ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 1,
2006, 1:08 PM), http://arstechnica.com/old/content/2006/08/7397.ars.
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tremendous value-add—one more thing to help attract customers to
126
our broadband service.”
ESPN’s model has drawn objections from the same groups that
advocate for network neutrality. Ben Scott, the policy director for
Free Press, has said,
Ultimately, if you carry it to its logical extreme—that’s everyone
charging for their content, and depending upon where you are and
which ISP you’re using to connect to the internet, your internet
experience is different—that’s a really unsettling prospect. . . . I
think it undermines the foundational principles that make the
127
internet such an engine of innovation and creativity.

Gigi Sohn, the President of Public Knowledge, called on the FCC to
investigate the service on the ground that such “[e]xclusive deals, for
example, could block providers of Internet video from offering
certain types of content to their customers or prevent programmers
from making their content available directly to viewers. This would
prevent the emergence of Internet video services that could compete
128
with MVPDs.”
The ESPN arrangement is an example of contractual vertical
integration. At first blush, it seems to be driven by ESPN’s power as a
content provider, exercising its copyright and licensing protections in
order to raise revenues. It does not seem to be a case of
discrimination by the ISPs, which is the typical concern of network
neutrality. But it is, in fact, an example of traditional windowing
taken into the Internet realm, in which channel exclusivity allows
market segmentation. In the Internet era, it would be trivially easy for
ESPN to offer the content of ESPN3.com to any customer who has a
credit card. Why does it not? Because the fees that it generates from
ISPs are in part based on the exclusivity generated—as the quotes
from Verizon reveal—and that exclusivity has value to the extent that
it encourages switching. A subscriber-pays alternative to payment by
the ISP would not eliminate the advantage an ISP could claim, but it

126. Van Buskirk, supra note 124 (quoting Cliff Lee, Verizon spokesman); see also
Bangeman, supra note 125 (“With Verizon rolling out its FiOS fiber network in selected areas,
having premium content like ESPN360 may help convince some customers to switch.”).
127. Van Buskirk, supra note 124 (quoting Scott).
128. Gigi B. Sohn, President, Pub. Knowledge, Statement Before the Federal
Communications Commission National Broadband Plan Workshop: Best Practices/Big Ideas 2
(Sept. 3, 2009), available at http://www.publicknowledge.org/pdf/gbsohn-ostatement-20090903
.pdf.
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might invite the same criticism leveled at cable bundling: why is the
ISP building into its price a charge for everyone, even though most do
not care to watch out-of-market college football or Bundesliga
soccer?
TV Everywhere is the most recent of these three online-video
business models, and its form of exclusivity is the most tightly tied to
traditional media distributors. With TV Everywhere, subscribers to
traditional MVPD services can access over the Internet much of the
content that was available on their cable systems. Although Comcast
129
and Time Warner began the service on their own in 2009, it has
130
expanded to include Verizon. But, in all instances, non-MVPD
131
subscribers cannot view the programming through the service. On
the one hand, the cable companies claim that this is a consumerfriendly development that is designed to respond to consumer
demand to see the content, for which they are already paying,
through multiple devices and in multiple locations—solutions
consumers were beginning to implement on their own through digital
132
video recorders and devices such as the Slingbox. On the other
hand, a coalition of the same public interest groups that push for
network neutrality rules has condemned the arrangement as likely to
133
stifle online video services.

129. Eliot Van Buskirk, Cable Departs from Hulu Model with “TV Everywhere,” CNN.COM
(June 26, 2009), http://articles.cnn.com/2009-06-26/tech/wired.tv.everywhere_1_hulu-cablesubscribers-television-programmers.
130. Yinka Adegoke, Time Warner Cable, Verizon to Test TV on the Web, REUTERS, Aug.
27, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/08/27/us-timewarnercable-idUSTRE57
Q0WY20090827.
131. See, e.g., Matthew Lasar, TV Everywhere: Gift to Consumers or Plot to Kill Online TV?,
ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 6, 2010, 10:01 AM), http://arstechnica.com/telecom/news/2010/01/tveverywhere-causing-controversy-everywhere.ars.
132. See Jessica L. Talar, Note, My Place or Yours: Copyright, Place-Shifting, & the
Slingbox: A Legislative Proposal, 17 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 25, 27–29 (2007)
(describing the operation of the Slingbox).
133. E.g., Press Release, Pub. Knowledge, Public Knowledge Criticizes ‘TV Everywhere’
(June 24, 2009), available at http://www.publicknowledge.org/node/2493 (“Limiting access to
programming is straight out of the cable playbook, going back to the days when Congress had to
act in 1992 to allow the satellite programming distributors to have access to cable programming.
This new version raises substantial anti-competitive issues by restricting the availability of
programming to the favored distribution methods.”); Josh Silver, Comcast Launches “TV
Everywhere”: Say Goodbye to Free Online Television, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 4, 2010, 6:13
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/josh-silver/comcast-launches-tv-every_b_411057.html
(“TV Everywhere is designed to protect the current cable TV subscription model and block
competition from upstart online video ventures like Vuze, Roku and Hulu.”).
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TV Everywhere “has been slow to materialize,” both in terms of
significant use by cable customers and in terms of the amount of
134
content available through the service. What is not known is the
degree to which content licensed to TV Everywhere is licensed on an
exclusive basis, such that content providers would agree to not make
it available through other streaming or video-on-demand services. If
the licenses were nonexclusive, this would lend credence to the cable
companies’ descriptions. But if the licenses are exclusive, then the
availability of the online content is another incentive to drive
consumers to traditional cable subscriptions. For Comcast, the merger
135
conditions provide limits here, but those, of course, apply only to
NBC-Comcast.
To be sure, these three offerings do not exhaust the universe of
online video business models, but most of the other implementations
are not “closed” in any relevant sense or in any sense different from
Hulu’s requiring a subscription. YouTube is a multibillion dollar
online video business and, although its content is largely amateur, it
has increasingly moved to hosting channels of professional
productions, such as music videos and even some authorized clips of
broadcast television. Even amateur online video is relevant in the
market, however, for it draws eyeballs from professional video. A
bevy of other start-ups is attempting to aggregate enough content and
distribution to make a play in this market.
C. Video Is Not the End
Specialized video offerings are not the last word in managed
services that Internet-access providers could offer to their customers,
even if they are the most naturally related to providers’ current
businesses. Most of the broadband distribution companies, whether
they are incumbent cable, cable overbuilders, or new fiber entrants,
136
offer voice services over their platforms. These services are usually
provided on a managed basis, even though they could be provided
solely as applications running on the Internet-access portion of the
platform, as they are when offered by non-facilities-based VoIP

134. Brian Stelter, Two Hints at Stepped-Up Media Rivalry in Online Streaming, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 2, 2011, at B3.
135. See supra notes 58–76 and accompanying text.
136. See, e.g., Saul Hansell, Questions on the Future of Landlines and the Risks to Phone
Companies, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2009, at B6 (noting that cable companies are swallowing up an
increasing share of the telecommunications market by offering broadband and voice services).
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companies. The reason for this is quality of service: the provider can
manage the bandwidth dedicated to voice service, both in the local
access network and through backbone capacity, to ensure that the call
quality is high and not degraded by other traffic. Two-way voice
telephony is subject to jitter and latency concerns to an extent that
137
even streaming video, which can be buffered, is not. The ComcastNBC Consent Decree excludes VoIP from its definition of specialized
services, probably because the FCC has already clearly defined
nondiscrimination obligations for VoIP access. If the FCC has legal
authority to regulate any service provided outside of traditional
telephony and cable services, it has legal authority to regulate VoIP
138
that interconnects with the traditional telephone network. VoIP
could be extended to offer managed video-conference solutions in the
139
future, a service currently offered by others on Internet platforms.
Beyond pure communications or media services, one can imagine
platform providers offering a variety of other managed services to
their customers. The platform provider would assert, at least, that
these managed services would benefit from a guaranteed quality of
service and therefore could not be as easily offered over the Internetaccess portion of the platform. The Comcast-NBC materials suggest
140
one such service: medical monitoring and associated health services.
Under some discussed implementations, the service would entail not
just the housing of medical records in personalized, cloud-based
accounts, but also a variety of real-time services, ranging from
emergency-call service to the collection of medical data from testing
141
devices or even from body monitors.
137. E.g., Princy Mehta & Sanjay Udani, Voice Over IP, IEEE POTENTIALS, Oct.–Nov.
2001, at 36, 36.
138. This is because such a service would be interconnected with a Title II
telecommunications service and therefore “ancillary” to it. See Speta, supra note 8, at 121
(discussing the FCC’s ancillary jurisdiction).
139. One such example is Skype, which supports group video calling. See Business, SKYPE,
http://www.skype.com/intl/en-us/business (last visited Apr. 5, 2011).
140. See Applications of Comcast Corp., General Electric Co., and NBC Universal, Inc. for
Consent to Assign Licenses and Transfer Control of Licenses, 52 Commc’ns Reg. (P & F) 249,
299 (2011) (memorandum opinion and order) (noting the “health and cultural” educational
information that can be provided as a result of the merger).
141. E.g., NEAL NEUBERGER, INTERNET INNOVATION ALLIANCE, ADVANCING
HEALTHCARE THROUGH BROADBAND: OPENING UP A WORLD OF POSSIBILITIES 4 (2007),
available at http://internetinnovation.org/files/special-reports/Advancing_Healthcare_Through_
Broadband_-_Neuberger.pdf; Philip J. Weiser, Dale Hatfield & Brad Bernthal, The Future of 91-1: New Technologies and the Need for Reform, 6 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 213, 243
(2008).
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Alternatively, many of the envisioned implementations of smartgrid technologies, or intense demand-side power management, have a
142
strong communications component. Electric companies are resisting
some of these implementations on the ground that they might provide
143
an insecure entryway into the electricity network. Broadband
providers might, therefore, offer energy monitoring and feedback
systems on a managed basis to provide an enhanced level of security
as well as guaranteed up-time. Such offerings might well be exclusive
between the broadband carriers and the power companies.
A third example of managed service offerings based on qualityof-service claims would be telecommuting options. Companies are
paying more attention to the security of remote connections. And the
bandwidth demands of telecommuters—who not only need access to
bandwidth-intensive corporate applications but also are increasingly
using video conferencing and online meetings while telecommuting—
continue to grow. Combined with a move to cloud-based enterprise
services, which themselves often involve a managed network
component, the broadband providers could offer a quality-of-service
144
claim for these services.
To be sure, all of these services could be offered over a generic
Internet connection, and many companies have already begun to
145
develop them for such delivery. Nevertheless, broadband providers
might claim to be uniquely positioned to offer some aspects of these

142. E.g., V.K. SOOD, D. FISCHER, J.M. EKLUND & T. BROWN, DEVELOPING A
COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE FOR THE SMART GRID 1 (2009), available at
http://www.wireie.com/pdfs/Developing_a_Communication_Infrastructure_for_the_Smart_Grid
.pdf.
143. E.g., Clark W. Gellings, Marek Samotyj & Bill Howe, The Future’s Smart Delivery
System, IEEE POWER & ENERGY MAG., Sept.–Oct. 2004, at 40, 43 (“Maintaining the security of
electric power supplies to these systems will become increasingly important in years to come.
An EPRI survey of electric utilities revealed real concerns about grid and communications
security.”).
144. See, e.g., Deborah Gage, VCs: The Time to Make Money in Security Has Finally
Arrived, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 2011, http://blogs.wsj.com/venturecapital/2011/02/14/vcs-the-timeto-make-money-in-security-has-finally-arrived (detailing the venture capital opportunities that
exist in computer security as a result of uncertainties in cloud computing); see also Joanne
Taaffe, Changing Face, TOTAL TELECOM, Feb. 1, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 2115149
(noting Microsoft’s ever-increasing list of telecommunications offerings, including cloud-based
services, which appear to be a direct response to competitive pressures within the industry
resulting from the possibilities of cloud platforms).
145. See, e.g., IP ALARMS, http://www.internet-alarm.net/home.html (last visited Mar. 12,
2011).
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services—especially security and reliability. A recent white paper by
CISCO argues that
[s]ervice providers must employ a strategy that enables them to
move up the managed services stack, thereby benefiting from higher
margins and driving primary demand for lower-level services. . . .
To differentiate delivery, the computing structure must move into
the network to provide [service providers] with end-to-end control,
resulting in the ability to guarantee service-level agreements and
provide extensive and sophisticated levels of monitoring and
146
support.

Even in the days of traditional telephony, network providers sought
to provide enterprise services that included not only “dumb pipe”
services but also a variety of customized communications, network,
147
and service packages. That incentive will certainly be duplicated,
and these are only a few of the interesting value-added services that
broadband to the home may make possible.
The point is not to criticize these offerings. Indeed, it might in
fact be beneficial to provide enhanced security and reliability for
some of them, and it might be that those extra aspects of service are
more easily provided over a segmented portion of the platform rather
than as part of the generic Internet-access stream. But if the Internet
portion of the platform is subject to network neutrality rules or
similar norms, then the incentive difficulties simply reappear. The
broadband provider would not provide enhanced service to its entire
Internet-access customer base, and network neutrality would allow
the provider—or require it—to refuse to offer enhanced service to
those companies willing to pay for it.
III. THE INEVITABILITY OF ANTITRUST META-SUPERVISION
The foregoing two stories reach the point of overlapping: The
first Part shows the interaction effect between network neutrality
regulation and the traditional services offered by cable and other

146. BRYAN MOBLEY, STUART TAYLOR & ANDREW YOUNG, CISCO INTERNET BUS.
SOLUTIONS GRP., NEXT GENERATION MANAGED SERVICES: A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY
FOR SERVICE PROVIDERS 6–7 (2009), available at http://www.cisco.com/web/about/ac79/docs/
pov/VMS_POV_0717FINAL.pdf.
147. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. INDUSTRIAL OUTLOOK 28-11 (1992) (noting
that “an important issue for AT&T during 1992 will be its ability to continue offering
customized service packages”).
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multichannel companies. Traditional business models can give rise to
incentives to take actions that can negate the effect of any network
neutrality regulation. Worse, network neutrality rules can also give
rise to incentives to limit innovation on the broadband platform by
deploying new services as managed services instead. The second Part
shows, against the background of the customary use of windowing
and tiering, that these business models are also finding their way into
online video-distribution businesses. These narratives converge on
two lessons. First, nondiscrimination rules cannot be selectively
applied to converged carriers’ Internet services without a significant
loss of effectiveness of those rules or, alternatively, without significant
attention paid to the interaction effect by limiting carriers’ options to
provide other kinds of services. Second, a noneconomic discussion of
network neutrality rules—that is, one that is driven principally by
something other than foreclosure concerns—is an impoverished
approach. Given the technological and business reality that a carrier
can shift content or services from an Internet-delivered
implementation to a managed service outside of the Internet
platform, the costs and benefits of nondiscrimination can only be
evaluated within a construct that takes account of this
multidimensional foreclosure. In sum, one may be able to make a
wholly noneconomic case for network neutrality rules, but those rules
will be ineffective and can only be rescued by an antitrust-like
competition analysis.
First, nondiscrimination rules cannot be applied to the Internet
portion of a broadband platform alone without a serious loss of
general effectiveness. The domain of network neutrality rules,
however, is in fact usually limited to the Internet-access portion of a
platform. Moreover, limiting such rules to the Internet services
domain may well be compelled by the Communications Act as
currently stated. If the managed service were a “cable service,” then
nondiscrimination treatment would be precluded by the Act’s
148
prohibition on regulating cable services as common carriage. If the
managed service were not a “cable service,” then the FCC might
149
characterize it as an “information service.” But the FCC would

148. For a discussion of the prohibition on regulating cable services as common carriage, see
supra notes 16–23 and accompanying text.
149. See 47 U.S.C. § 153(20) (2006) (“The term ‘information service’ means the offering of a
capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or
making available information via telecommunications, and includes electronic publishing, but
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almost certainly not have regulatory authority over that “information
150
service.” In Comcast Corp. v. FCC, the D.C. Circuit emphatically
stated that the FCC does not have general regulatory authority over
information services: it can only regulate if the information service is
151
ancillary to a “statutorily mandated responsibility.” And the FCC
has no statutorily mandated responsibility that could be stretched to
apply nondiscrimination rules to managed services. Thus, the FCC
has no regulatory tool that would forbid the carrier from developing
business responses to a nondiscrimination rule on its Internet
platform by moving content or services to a managed platform or
152
offering.
In fact, it bears noting that the managed service need not be
provided on a separate platform. So long as the FCC does not forbid
vertical integration, the carrier can combine with a content or services
company and offer it on the Internet platform, but offer it in a
selective manner similar to ESPN3.com. ESPN3.com does not make
its content available to every consumer on the Internet who is willing
to pay; it is a cable channel on an Ethernet connection. If the
restriction is imposed by the content or application provider, then it
does not offend a network neutrality rule on the carrier.
Moreover, these possibilities for evasion are not the only danger
of a nondiscrimination rule restricted to the Internet-access service of
converged platforms. The rule could be counterproductive to the
broader goals of network neutrality. If substantial numbers of services
are pulled from the Internet platform into managed services offerings,
their visibility outside of the carrier’s closed ecosystem would
diminish. The Internet’s role as the general locus of innovation could
be diminished, as carriers and other parties focus not on Internet

does not include any use of any such capability for the management, control, or operation of a
telecommunications system or the management of a telecommunications service.”). Even this
characterization would be doubtful, as the service might well not be offered “via
telecommunications,” because telecommunications are “the transmission, between or among
points specified by the user, of information of the user’s choosing, without change in the form or
content of the information as sent and received.” Id. § 153(43). Depending on the service, there
might not be any specification by the user of “points” for the transmission.
150. Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
151. See id. at 661 (quoting Am. Library Ass’n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 692 (2005) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
152. The FCC did, in its December 2010 Open Internet Order, attempt to re-establish its
jurisdiction over Internet services. Preserving the Open Internet, 25 FCC Rcd. 17,905, 52
Commc’ns Reg. (P & F) 1, 36–44 (Dec. 21, 2010) (report and order). Even that order does not
offer a more general theory that would cover managed services.
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services but on managed services. This would be a shift of the
innovation locus which, in my view, could be either good or bad. But
the shift does run counter to the general policy articulated by many
network neutrality advocates: maximizing the possibility of
153
innovation done independently of the carriers. The objection that
“managed Internet” services offend the open innovation ethic of the
Internet has already been made by the network neutrality advocates
154
who object to ESPN3.com.
To be sure, one statutory response that would overcome the
evasion of a network neutrality rule would be to require cable
companies and other converged platform providers to offer all
services on a common-carrier basis or to forbid any vertical
integration. Radical structural separation of content and carriage has
been proposed before, in a variety of contexts, to respond to a variety
of competition or discrimination problems. The 1956 AT&T Consent
Decree forbade the Bell System from being in the content business, a
result thought important because AT&T was also the principal means
155
by which television content moved around the country. The 1982
AT&T Consent Decree also initially prohibited the Bell Operating
156
Companies from providing electronic publishing. United States v.
157
Paramount Pictures, Inc. required the movie companies to divest
their ownership in their principal distribution channel—the first-run
158
movie theaters. And similar calls for requiring cable companies to
159
be common carriers echo from at least the mid-1980s.
Communications policy, however, has almost always rejected
such radical separation, as evidenced in numerous sections of the
Communications Act. Instead, the Act has generally treated vertical
integration as acceptable, within limits, or at least as tolerable. As
already noted, the Act forbids regulating broadcast licensees and
153. See, e.g., Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons
Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917, 1012–20 (2005).
154. See supra notes 127–28 and accompanying text.
155. United States v. W. Elec. Co., 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 68,246, at 71,138 (D.N.J.).
156. United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 185 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d sub nom.
Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
157. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
158. Id. at 172 (“It is the relationship of the unreasonable restraints of trade to the position
of the defendants in the exhibition field (and more particularly in the first-run phase of that
business) that is of first importance on the divestiture phase of these cases.”).
159. See, e.g., ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 172 (1983) (predicting
that, once a majority of programming has shifted from broadcast to pay channels, cable “cannot
in a free society be other than a carrier”).
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cable companies as common carriers. The FCC’s Computer II and
162
Computer III rules allowed common carriers to offer information
services, although there were at times requirements that such services
be offered through separate subsidiaries or that common carriers
develop access arrangements that other information services
163
providers could purchase to duplicate the carriers’ own offerings.
Broadcast licensing has been successively liberalized to allow the
164
networks to own licenses covering greater portions of the country.
And, in cable particularly, vertical integration has long been
permitted. Cable companies are allowed to program almost all of
their channels, and they are also allowed to own many of the channels
165
that they choose to program.
The reason is that communications policy has long recognized
the (at least potential) benefits of vertical integration between
content and carriage. In broadcasting, vertical integration created
substantial efficiencies in the markets for programming, advertising,
and distribution. In information services, the carriers were thought to
bring a unique capability to provide innovative services.
Cable, in particular, shows a back-and-forth in which the benefits
of vertical integration are recognized but balanced with the possibility
that vertical integration or similar contractual exclusivity can create
foreclosure—in this case the exclusion of distribution competitors by
denying them access to valuable content or the exclusion of content
competitors by denying them access to valuable distribution channels.
166
The 1992 Cable Act required the FCC to set horizontal and vertical

160. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
161. Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations (Second
Computer Inquiry) (Computer II), 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980) (final decision).
162. Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the Commission’s Rules and Regulations (Third
Computer Inquiry) (Computer III), 104 F.C.C.2d 958 (1986) (report and order).
163. For an analysis of the FCC’s Computer II rule, see Robert Cannon, The Legacy of the
Federal Communications Commission’s Computer Inquiries, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 167, 181–99
(2003). For a discussion of the Computer III rule, see id. at 199–203.
164. See generally Adam Candeub, Media Ownership Regulation, the First Amendment, and
Democracy’s Future, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1547, 1555–61 (2008) (charting the FCC’s history of
regulating media ownership).
165. See Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (reversing
the FCC’s imposition of “horizontal and vertical limits” on cable companies).
166. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-385,
106 Stat. 1460 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
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ownership limits for cable operators. In setting the vertical limit, the
FCC reviewed the benefits of allowing some integration:
First, [cable multiple system operator] MSO investment has
produced a wealth of high quality cable programming services.
Many of the most popular cable programming services were
initiated or sustained with the help of MSO investment. Second,
vertical integration between cable operators and video programming
services appears to produce efficiencies in the distribution,
marketing, and purchase of programming. Third, vertical integration
can reduce programming costs, which in turn may reduce subscriber
fees and cable rates. Fourth, vertical integration may in certain
circumstances foster investment in more innovative and riskier
168
programming services.

The Act also limited exclusivity agreements, however, through the
program access rules, which required cable companies to provide
169
certain programs to competing multichannel platforms. Here, the
concern for foreclosure of competing platforms was paramount. As
the FCC explained,
As a general matter, the public interest in exclusivity in the sale of
entertainment programming is widely recognized. Indeed, elsewhere
in the 1992 Cable Act, in the context of broadcast station-cable
system relationship, specific steps have been taken to protect
exclusive rights. In the unique situation presented here, however, it
is clear that exclusivity is not favored. Congress has clearly placed a
higher value on new competitive entry than on the continuation of
170
exclusive distribution practices . . . .

This same balancing act is present even in the NBC-Comcast
Consent Decree, notwithstanding its sometimes clear requirements
that the company license on terms prevailing in the market. The DOJ
acknowledged that “[t]he video programming distribution industry
frequently uses exclusive contract terms that can be

167. 47 U.S.C. § 548(c) (2006).
168. Implementation of Sections 11 and 13 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection
and Competition Act of 1992: Horizontal and Vertical Ownership Limits, 8 FCC Rcd. 8565,
8594–95 (1993) (second report and order).
169. 47 U.S.C. § 548.
170. Implementation of Sections 12 and 19 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection
and Competition Act of 1992: Development of Competition and Diversity in Video
Programming Distribution and Carriage, 8 FCC Rcd. 3359, 3384 (1993) (first report and order).
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procompetitive.” For example, it can “maximize the revenues [that]
it earns” and also “encourage[] the various distributors, such as cable
companies, to promote the content during a distribution window by
assuring the distributor that the content will not be available through
172
other distribution channels at a lower price.”
As operationalized, the Decree does have some prophylactic
rules, but the general principle seems to be one of balance: “The
proposed Final Judgment strikes a balance by allowing reasonable
and customary exclusivity provisions that enhance competition while
prohibiting those provisions that, without any offsetting
procompetitive benefits, hinder the development of effective
173
competition from OVDs.” Comcast is forbidden to enter into
contracts that condition its purchase of video programming on the
programmer’s not licensing the content to online video providers, but
Comcast may secure exclusive agreements for a fourteen-day window
(or an agreement for a thirty-day window forbidding free online
distribution) or such exclusive agreements as are secured by other
174
MVPDs. This last condition does allow exclusivity to develop in the
marketplace, while seeking to cabin any market power that Comcast
may have.
In short, if one rules out prohibitions on vertical integration, as
the Act generally has, then a nondiscrimination rule addressed to
only a portion of a platform is seriously problematic.
This leads back to the nature of nondiscrimination rules.
Nondiscrimination has never been a significant part of the video
production market and has only played a minor role in the video
distribution market. This is because producers and distributors both
face an economic problem—the low marginal cost of their product—
and the possibility of segmenting customers and producers maximizes
revenues for both producers and distributors. The application of a
nondiscrimination rule to a new distribution technology—the
Internet-access portion of a platform—creates a revenue problem for
the distributor, and consequently for the producer as well, which
explains why both the cable companies and the copyright holders are
nervous about Hulu-type business models and are looking for

171.
172.
173.
174.

Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 63, at 35.
Id.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 37.
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The potential loss of revenues when traditional
alternatives.
business models are threatened by change creates pressure either to
replicate those models in the new distribution space or to restrict the
new distribution space’s potential to compete with the traditional
models. If regulation imposes a nondiscrimination rule for the new
distribution space, then the rule must be supplemented in two ways.
First, it must be supplemented by a mandate that the carrier not
restrict the size or scope of the new space in a way that limits the
damage to the traditional space (as a cable company might restrict
Internet bandwidth in order to protect traditional video business
models). And second, the nondiscrimination rule must be
supplemented by rules that forbid the carrier from offering new
services in a managed service format, in which it can apply traditional
business models.
Both of these conditions are present in Comcast-NBC. On the
first point, the DOJ and the FCC have required Comcast to maintain
significant Internet-access speeds to ensure that Comcast does not act
176
to restrict the Internet space as a competitor to video. Neither the
DOJ nor the FCC, however, seems to have wanted to try to write a
condition requiring the online side to grow. And on the second point,
the DOJ and the FCC have limited Comcast’s ability to offer
managed video services—the area of specialized services that most
177
concerned the regulators.
This in turn raises the second, more general question: what
arguments are adequate to support a nondiscrimination rule, either
general or highly specific in its implementation? The answer is that a
solely noneconomic case for nondiscrimination rules cannot capture
the entire problem. Attempting to describe a nondiscrimination
problem and solution without evaluating the regulation’s economic
effects will leave the problem underdescribed and the regulation

175. See, e.g., Dawn C. Chmielewski & Meg James, Hulu’s Tug of War with TV, L.A. TIMES,
May 11, 2009, at B1 (noting that media executives were “terrified” by Hulu and were
considering alternatives such as “authentication,” whereby Internet users would be required to
show proof of a paid TV subscription as a condition of watching current programs on Hulu);
Dawn C. Chmielewski & David Sarno, More TV Viewers May Be Cutting the Cord This Year,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jan/03/business/la-fi-electronics-show20110104 (describing the “fresh headaches” that Internet video has provided entertainmentindustry executives, primarily industry fears that online video content would disrupt traditional
cable TV viewing patterns and diminish advertising revenue).
176. See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 71–74 and accompanying text.
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ineffective. It is true that network neutrality regulation does have
proponents who argue that the rule is necessary to prevent
178
foreclosure strategies. But coming to dominate the debate are a
series of noneconomic arguments or what might be called
macroeconomic arguments. The noneconomic arguments contend
that network neutrality regulation is necessary to provide an
179
adequate space for new free speech activities. The macroeconomic
arguments focus on economic spillovers into other areas that are
possible if one regulates the Internet platform to essentially create a
new public utility, which I think is simply a more general argument
that Internet openness promotes innovation in applications and
180
content services. These arguments may be sufficient—although I
think generally not—for imposing a network neutrality rule on
Internet services. But given the interaction effects already described,
which can mute, eliminate, or reverse the effectiveness of the rule,
they cannot end the analysis.
This is the sense in which I believe that an antitrust analysis of
the space is inevitable, both generally and specifically. Only antitrust
provides the analytic tools necessary to determine whether
discrimination strategies are likely to be harmful in any individual
case, combined with an economic analysis that can identify incentives
and opportunities for companies to engage in compensating behaviors

178. In addition to Lemley and Lessig, supra note 6, the most prominent example is Barbara
van Schewick. See generally BARBARA VAN SCHEWICK, INTERNET ARCHITECTURE AND
INNOVATION (2010) (arguing that network providers are altering the internal structure of the
Internet in a manner that stifles innovation).
179. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Commentary, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A
Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2004)
(“By changing the social conditions of speech, digital technologies lead to new social conflicts
over the ownership and control of information capital. . . . But the same technologies also
produce new methods of control that can limit democratic cultural participation. Therefore, free
speech values—interactivity, mass participation, and the ability to modify and transform
culture—must be protected through technological design and through administrative and
legislative regulation of technology . . . .”); Marvin Ammori, Network Neutrality and the 21st
Century First Amendment, BALKINIZATION (Dec. 10, 2009, 10:54 AM), http://balkin.blogspot
.com/2009/12/net-neutrality-and-21st-century-first.html (“Phone and cable companies
want . . . to block user requests, charge software companies and websites discriminatory prices
to reach users, and even cut exclusive deals . . . . A network neutrality rule, quite simply, would
forbid the phone and cable [sic] from interfering with the Internet in these ways.”).
180. See, e.g., Frischmann, supra note 153, at 997–98 (“These cumulative processes also
involve nonlinear progression, feedback loops, spillovers, and numerous other complications
that frustrate modelers and defy simplification. All of these characteristics contribute to
information and transaction cost problems that make relying on property-based, market-driven
management of basic research results almost outrageous . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
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such as a move to managed services. Video economics thrives when
both producers and distributors engage in certain kinds of
discrimination. The adoption of nondiscrimination rules without
regard to interaction effects outside their stated domain can drive
services from the regulated domain to other types of offerings. A
nondiscrimination rule, unless it forbids many beneficial or at least
benign business strategies, cannot alone address this concern.
Antitrust asks the questions necessary to determine whether
discrimination is a likely indicator of foreclosure—whether the parties
have market power and how the relevant markets operate. Antitrust
also attends to possible efficiencies of vertical arrangements,
including arrangements that involve discrimination.
By antitrust, I mean antitrust-type reasoning that addresses
whether discrimination is likely to evidence foreclosure and that is
flexible enough to identify overlapping markets in the manner in
which Internet access and managed services necessarily overlap. Such
reasoning need not be tied to traditional antitrust institutions, such as
the Federal Trade Commission or the DOJ Antitrust Division. Those
entities face a doctrinal problem that pure access regulation is
probably not an available antitrust liability theory or remedy, at least
181
under the current doctrine. Foreclosure actions remain available,
but these actions raise an institutional question that is beyond the
scope of this paper. If one selects the traditional institutions of
antitrust, then one probably loses the ability to act based on
predictive judgments about competitive effects. The future of the
FCC—to recall this Symposium’s title—is to make exactly these sorts
of predictive judgments, supported by evidence, in the markets in
which it is expert.
CONCLUSION
The Comcast-NBC transaction highlights a reality of
multipurpose, converged platforms that has been all too absent from
the network neutrality debate in recent years. In particular, it
highlights the possibility that such a platform provider would have

181. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 411
(2004) (concluding that there was no antitrust action for denial of access required by the
Telecommunications Act of 1996); James B. Speta, Modeling an Antitrust Regulator for
Telecoms, in ANTITRUST AND REGULATION IN THE EU AND US: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVES 101, 106 (François Lévêque & Howard Shelanski eds., 2009) (concluding that
Trinko forbids antitrust actions to ensure access).
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both the ability and the incentive to evade a nondiscrimination rule
addressed to the Internet portion of the platform. Discrimination
strategies designed to enhance revenues have long been important in
both content and distribution markets, as demonstrated by
widespread and widely accepted windowing, tiering, and bundling
strategies. If nondiscrimination regulation forbids those sorts of
strategies, then carriers will have the incentive to restrict the Internetaccess channel or to shift content and services to managed portions of
the platform, in which case the effectiveness of nondiscrimination
rules would be severely compromised.
This specific example also teaches a broader lesson about the
limits of noneconomic reasoning in a largely commercial domain. A
noneconomic argument may be adequate to support government
intervention, but such an argument alone is insufficient to account for
the feedback effects that managed services make available. In order
to account for the ecosystem, one needs the tools of competition
analysis.

